The disastrous performance of Boeing is a result of both Internal organizational problems and external conditions, which constitute a crippled complex network. To solve this “wicked problem”, instead of using the dated vending-machine model, we should take the collaborative governance and use “the tool centered approach” to combat the “cultural corruption” “private interests capture” “self- regulation” and many other challenges within. The theory of “the Hickenlooper Way” “Boundary spanning” “public value governance” etc. are proven feasible.
The Boeing Company has formed a collaborative network with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Defense of America(DOD) and many other private partners. But this network seems to be poorly designed and have disastrous consequences. After its first crashes of Boeing 737, a commercial airplane in Indonesia at 2018, causing 189 death, Boeing company blame the polit and refuse to take effective measures to prevent possible future crashes. Only one year later, another crash happened with Boeing 737 in Ethiopia, causing another 157 death. Shortly after the second crash, all Boeing 737 airplane was grounded, and more details emerged as Boeing company went through judicial investigations and civil lawsuits.
With the collaborative efforts from victims’ family, whistle blowers, FAA officials, media and others, Boeing are found guilty with insufficient informing and training for pilots with its new M-CAS control system, deceiving the FAA officials with M-CAS system, covering up the truth after the first airplane crash, and retaliating whistle blowers. In 2024, Boeing officially accepts a plea agreement proposed by the US Department of Justice with a 487 million fine.
Today, Boeing is still in big trouble. This once well-known aviation company for its high standard safety culture and engineering, is suffering from big challenges like strikes, failing space operation with NASA, self-inspection and regulatory reforms and many other. These problems mainly includes:
a) Boeing’s safety Culture has been compromised. Boeing prioritize profits over engineering for a long time after it bought the McDonnell Douglas. b) Boeing’s leadership and decision-making is lack of transparency and participation. Boeing’s leadership intentional ignore problems in manufacture process to maximize profits. c) Boeing’s shared discretion with authority fail to achieve good self-inspection result, and lack of legitimacy. Boeing substitute public interests with its own private interests. d) Current Boeing self-regulation and FAA Supervision is insufficient, under-funded, and lack of accountability. FAA is don’t have the capability to prevent Boeing’s illegal activity like documents fraud and abuse of discretion power in terms of inspecting and certificating. e) Legal frame and judicial process fail to judge airplane crash caused by commercial activity fairly. The tort law and judiciary process are unable to deliver adequate punitive merits and unable to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.
Similar to the war against Malaria, the governance of Boeing is also a “wicked” problem, for Boeing are in a dynamic and complicated network that across national, industrial and regulatory boundaries, thus hard for government to regulate alone and could cause unintended consequences.
To solve such a “wicked” problem, instead of using the dated vending-machine model, scholars has come to a consensus that government authorities must to play a flexible role that of both “rowing” “steering”, “catalyzing” and others to harvest the synergy of collaborative network governance with a “boundary spanning” approach. As the past suggest, we are entering into an era of Public value governance, which is beyond traditional pubic administration and the new public management.[i] In this era, government entities should play a catalyst role that can convene, align and promote private entities to generate public value, like what the North Star Foundation have done to fight HIV in Africa.[ii] To make the “third party governance” work well, bridgebuilder should adopt an integrative thinking to integrate the resources and expertise from public and private sectors.[iii]
With the major problem identified and networking approach mentioned above, the key is to make feasible arrangement to implement a strategic plan[iv], and use “tool centered approach”[v] to make sure efficiency and legitimacy, which includes:
I. To reconstruct a better Boeing network, the Hickenlooper Way provide a good structure to design a strategy plan to solve the Boeing’s “Wicked problem” in five steps.[vi] a) Define the problem. As mentioned above. b) Create an unambiguous shared goal. Develop Boeing FAA and others’ objectives and missions to build the safest aerospace system and especially ensure the right perception and commitments from members in Boeing’s network to a shared the objective, for the right perception of each unit makes sure the network run much more coordinatively and automatically.[vii] c) Keep it local. Involve victim’s family, engineers and whistleblowers into a supervision mechanism, because they are the closest to the problems, and they carry common interests and can create public value. d) Think sideways. Using social media, whistle blower and international cooperation to promote Boeing’s transparency. e) Look for interdependencies. Create a culture of information and resources sharing within the network, like lawyers.
II. To mitigate the complicity in a multitiered system, the Boeing network governance can use a “boundary spanning” value creation. FAA and Boeing can integrate horizontal partnerships(state-market-society) and vertical jurisdictions to create public value. Boeing has many shared discretions with public authorities like FAA and DOD, and also have enormous amount of contractors with high technology globally. FAA can learn from Canada’s recent Innovation Superclusters Initiative as case study, which sheds some light on how to facilitate the integration of ideas and resources across organizations and jurisdictions.[viii]
III. To solve FAA’s capability and delegation problems, FAA can use powerful catalytic tools and put tools at the center.[ix] As shown in the Greater Miami Neighborhoods program, Funding and program allow the program to achieve public value with both governmental subsidies and private resources.[x] In the case of Boeing, FAA can use grants, contracts, procurement to finance different interest groups to from an inspection network and even delegate discretions to an independent quality control firm rather than to Boeing.
IV. To pressure Boeing’s leadership to restore a safety-first culture with accountability and transparency, FAA, the legislature and judicial branches can change relevant regulations, the tort law, the criminal law and audited procedures. According to Schacter, new legislation could carve out more of a role for third-party regulators to break Boeing and FAA’s complete control over the aircraft’s design and certification.[xi]
In conclusion, it takes chronic measures to regain Boeing and FAA reputation and build the public trust. With integrative thinking and collaborative governance, a healthy and efficient network across government, private and society can be established. In the process FAA should act as a catalyst organization, to develop a culture of agile leadership, to convene important players, to align their mission Vision and strategy, to exploit the collaborative authority, capital, information, and to ensure efficiency, accountability and transparency, at last, to make the safest aerospace system.
Reference:
[i] Bryson, John, “Public Value Governance: Moving Beyond traditional pubic administration and the new public management,” PAR, 2014, pp. 445-456
[ii] Luk N Van Wassenhove (INSEAD); Aline Gatignon (INSEAD) : Paving the Road to Healthy Highways: A Partnership to Scale Up HIV/AIVS Clinics in Africa, Ethics and Social Responsibility, 2008. https://www.thecasecentre.org/products/view?id=84536
[iii] Fisher, “Public Value and the Integrative Mind,” Public Administration Review (henceforth noted as PAR), August 2014, 457-463
[iv] Bert George, Successful Strategic Plan Implementation, PAR, July Aug 2021, pp. 793-797.
[v] Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1611 (2001)
[vi] William Eggers and Donald Kettl, Bridgebuilders, Harvard Business Press, 2023.
[vii] Ertan & Siciliano, “A cognitive network perspective for public administration and policy,” PAR 2023, pp. 11-17
[viii] Charles Conteh & Brittany Harding, 2023. “Boundary-spanning in public value co-creation through the lens of multilevel governance,” Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 104-128, January.
[ix] Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1611 (2001).
[x] To Understand a Growing Organization: Greater Miami Neighborhoods, Case, Harvard Kennedy School Case Program, 2010.
[xi] Schacter, “Delegating Safety: Boeing and the problem of self-regulating,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy,” vol 30, 2021, pp. 637-653.